MACINTYRE PATRIOTISM VIRTUE PDF

Views: Is Patriotism a Virtue? Ancient Greeks viewed patriotism as collective notions of language, ethics, justice and commitment to a set of universal values and principals. As one of the most revered philosophical figures of the twentieth century, Alasdair MacIntyre in his book Is Patriotism a Virtue? Identifying patriotism is one of the basic philosophical issues among scholars. Bearing in mind so many contradictory outlooks on the same topic, especially with regards to liberal conceptions of patriotism, Alasdair MacIntyre gives an elucidation in the beginning as to how patriotism can be identified.

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MacIntyre and the Morality of Patriotism July 4, by Wes Alwan 14 Comments Gary Gutting reflects this Fourth of July on the morality of patriotism , which is grounded in a kind of in-group loyalty at odds with moral theories that require that we treat all human beings equally, regardless of whether we are part of the same family, tribe, or nation.

He notes that Alasdair MacIntyre has given a defense of patriotism: Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, argues that morality is rooted in the life of a specific real community — a village, a city, a nation, with its idiosyncratic customs and history — and that, therefore, adherence to morality requires loyalty to such a community.

Patriotism, on this view, is essential for living a morally good life. For Aristotle, what is good for human beings are certain end-states toward which we naturally tend. These end-states perfect or fully actualize some set of dispositions, some potentiality. Just as an acorn will tend to develop toward an end that actualizes its full potential Oak tree , human beings strive to function well in a way that is appropriate to human being.

And some human beings will adopt ends that are at odds with their own nature: which is to say, they will have two sets of dispositions in conflict.

One set of dispositions is determined by the kind of thing they are — by their human nature; the other by something particular to them, based on their idiosyncratic development.

Insofar as John belongs to the type serial killer, or even the sui generis type John-the-Serial-Killer, he will have tendencies discordant with his nature.

Likewise with the serial killer who has ceased to be human. As we have seen, our ends our determined by the type of beings we are. And these groups and activities structure me -- alter the kind of being I am: they give me certain potentialities, toward which I naturally strive. Chess may have meant little to me until I started playing it: but once I start, I create a new set of inward dispositions that will survive even my subjective loss of interest in chess.

So the activities and practices into which we enter not only give us a certain set of skills, but a tendency to continue to perfect those skills.

Of course, one could give an Aristotelian response to this Aristotelian defense of patriotism: which is to say, I might fall in with the wrong crowd.

Not every group is good for me. Ultimately, I have to revert to my membership in some core natural kind — the human kind — to judge the appropriateness of the effects that practices and groups have on me.

They may give me dispositions that are at odds with my humanity and hence my happiness. And of course, most cases are as extreme as this: as we grow our experiences structure us, and these structures take on a self-preserving and self-actualizing life of their own — sometimes to our detriment, to sometimes to our benefit.

So the question then becomes whether being American, Norwegian, or belonging to any other sort of group or practice, is ultimately good for us or bad when measured against ends defined by our humanity. And this leads us back to a conception of morality which, while still Aristotelian, seems consistent with the kind of enlightenment moral standpoint — a universal one — that MacIntyre has used Aristotle to argue against.

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MacIntyre and the Morality of Patriotism July 4, by Wes Alwan 14 Comments Gary Gutting reflects this Fourth of July on the morality of patriotism , which is grounded in a kind of in-group loyalty at odds with moral theories that require that we treat all human beings equally, regardless of whether we are part of the same family, tribe, or nation. He notes that Alasdair MacIntyre has given a defense of patriotism: Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, argues that morality is rooted in the life of a specific real community — a village, a city, a nation, with its idiosyncratic customs and history — and that, therefore, adherence to morality requires loyalty to such a community. Patriotism, on this view, is essential for living a morally good life. For Aristotle, what is good for human beings are certain end-states toward which we naturally tend. These end-states perfect or fully actualize some set of dispositions, some potentiality. Just as an acorn will tend to develop toward an end that actualizes its full potential Oak tree , human beings strive to function well in a way that is appropriate to human being. And some human beings will adopt ends that are at odds with their own nature: which is to say, they will have two sets of dispositions in conflict.

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