Thus, along with the introduction of a symbol for equality of content, all symbols are necessarily given a double meaning - the same symbols stand now for their own content, now for themselves. Elsewhere, names contribute the object for which they stand to the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur; why should they, in this one case, stand not for an object but for themselves? The idea of the cognitive significance of a sentence. According to that earlier view, a sentence like Hesperus is Phosphorus. But this relation could hold only inasmuch as they name or designate something. The relation, as it were, is mediated through the connection of each sign with the same nominatum.
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Thus, along with the introduction of a symbol for equality of content, all symbols are necessarily given a double meaning - the same symbols stand now for their own content, now for themselves. Elsewhere, names contribute the object for which they stand to the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur; why should they, in this one case, stand not for an object but for themselves? The idea of the cognitive significance of a sentence.
According to that earlier view, a sentence like Hesperus is Phosphorus. But this relation could hold only inasmuch as they name or designate something. The relation, as it were, is mediated through the connection of each sign with the same nominatum. This connection, however, is arbitrary. But this is just what we do want to express in many cases. Two related versions of the criticism: one relating to the subject matter, the other to the truth conditions, of identity sentences.
The dilemma this poses: it seems that names in identity sentences neither stand for themselves nor merely stand for objects. Then how are names functioning here? Just as one might think that what is said by identity sentences like The morning star is the morning star. The morning star is the evening star. Last morning, I was looking at the evening star. An even more obvious case: any sentences with the same truth-value.
But an adequate theory of language should also explain the links between linguistic expressions and their users. It seems plausible that one understands an expression iff one knows what it means. If this is right, then we have a new form in which we can raise our question about whether the theory of reference can serve as a full theory of the signification of language: we can ask whether to understand an expression, one must know its reference.
A complete knowledge of the nominatum would require that we could tell immediately in the case of any given sense whether it belongs to the nominatum. This we shall never be able to do. Just from understanding an expression, we are typically not in a position to know what its reference is. The case of sentences. Another way to put the point is given by the following argument involving co-referential expressions: To understand an expression is to know its meaning.
If two expressions have the same meaning, then anyone who understands both will be in a position to know this. Often, we can understand two expressions without knowing whether they have the same reference. Reference is not meaning. But there are sentences which seem to show that a theory of reference cannot, by itself, even explain the connections between sentences and the world.
Sentences about mental states and about necessity and possibility. This a further argument against taking a theory of reference to do all the work of a theory of meaning.
Bob believes that the greatest teacher of Alexander the Great was a philosopher. Bob believes that arithmetic is incomplete. Necessarily, all cordates are renates. Necessarily, the greatest mathematician is a mathematician. Necessarily, the greatest cyclist is a mathematician. Each of us is concerned with the contents of his own consciousness.
If someone takes thoughts to be ideas, what he then accepts as true is, on his own view, the content of his consciousness, and does not properly concern other people at all. If he heard from me the opinion that a thought is not an idea he could not dispute it, for, indeed, it would not now concern him. Widespread variance in images associated with individuals. No one would ever mean the same thing by a word as anyone else.
This makes sense of i the fact that different expressions can have the same sense but different reference, and ii the cases of difference in informativeness we have discussed. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the Moon through a telescope. I compare the Moon itself to the reference; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer.
The former I compare to the sense, the latter is like the idea or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneously.
But each one would have his own retinal image. Why would one think that sense determines reference? One reason: intuitively, if two sentences have the same sense, they same the same thing about the world; and if two sentences say the same thing about the world, they cannot differ in truth-value. But if the reference of a sentence is its truth-value, that means that the sense of a sentence determines its reference.
Can you see how you could use this as a premise to argue that the senses of sub-sentential expressions determine their reference? Reference does not determine sense: often, two expressions with the same reference will differ with respect to sense. But it may happen that one wants to talk about the words themselves or about their senses.
In writing we make use of quotes enclosing the word-icons. In indirect discourse we speak of the sense, e. From this it becomes clear that also in indirect discourse words do not have their customary nominata; they here name what would ordinarily be their sense. A semantics for propositional attitude expressions. What is called mood, atmosphere, illumination in a poem, what is portrayed by intonation and rhythm, does not belong to the thought. Further examples of the same sort: He was poor and honest.
He was poor but honest. They have two children. They have at least two children. He drove home and got drunk. He got drunk and drove home. We might say that the following sentences have the same sense, but different force: You are doing the reading for this course. Are you doing the reading for this course? Do the reading for this course! Criteria for sameness and difference of senses without much more information about what senses are.
The metaphysics of sense, and the third realm. A third realm must be recognized. Anything belonging to this realm has it in common with ideas that it cannot be perceived by the senses, but has it in common with things that it does not need an owner so as to belong to the contents of consciousness. Thus for example the thought we have expressed in the Pythagorean Theorem is timelessly true, true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true.
It needs no owner. It is not true only from the time when it is discovered; just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets. Connections between material objects and abstract objects.
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Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind categorize this paper. The argument for this claim is contained in the first pargraph of the paper. Frege then transitions, without explicit mention, into the development of his own view. Views Read Edit View history. On Sense, Reference, and Tone in History. For the river in Germany, see Sinn river. On Sense and Reference.
On sense and nominatum
The central purpose of this paper is to establish a distinction between the reference of an expression—primarily, a proper name—and what Frege calls its sense. This article has no associated abstract. For the watchmaker, see Sinn watchmaker. On sense and nominatum The reference of a sentence is its truth valueits sense is the thought that it expresses. Texts, Translations, and Commentary.
Indeed, for each condition defined above, the concepts that satisfy the condition are all pairwise equinumerous to one another. This extension contains all the concepts that satisfy Condition 0 above, and so the number of all such concepts is 0. Frege, however, had a deep idea about how to do this. Note that the last conjunct is true because there is exactly 1 object namely, Bertrand Russell that falls under the concept author of Principia Mathematica other than Whitehead. Using this definition as a basis, Frege later derived many important theorems of number theory.